Focus and the LF of NP quantification by Herburger, Elena
Focus and the LF of NP quantification" 
Elena Herburger 
University of Southern California 
1. The Definiteness Effect (Milsark 1 977 ):  
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Milsark ( 1977) observes that some NPs are acceptable in there· 
insertion contexts while others are not, as shown in ( 1 ) . He 
distinguishes them by the terms weak and strong. 
( 1 )  a. There are somelthree/many/few/no children in the garden 
b. There is (are) every/each/all/most child(ren) in the garden 
He also notes that the determiners introducing weak NPs have a 
special, what he calls 'cardinal ' reading. For instance, few in few 
children in ( 1a) does not mean the same as  few in  the parti tive NP 
few of the  c h ildren; whereas in the latter the determiner picks out 
a certain proportion of the children, in the former it means something 
like 'few in number' . 
Milsark shows, however, that once we change the environment, 
it becomes possible to in terpret few in few ch ildren very much like 
few in a partitive NP. Such a reading is optionally available if the NP 
is the subject of a so-called Stage Level (SL) predicate, as in (2a) :  
(2)  a. Few children are playing 
Here few ch ildren is ambiguous. It can be interpreted as 'children 
who are few in number' or in a manner very similar to the overt 
parti tive 'few of the children' . On the other hand, when the predicate 
is interpreted as a property-denoting Individual Level (IL) predicate, 
then the cardinal reading is absent and only the parti tive-like reading 
is available . 1 For instance, in: 
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1 Milsark actually uses the terms state descriptive predicate and property 
predicate. The former refers to 'conditions in which an entity finds itself and which 
are subject to change without there being any essential alteration of the entity' (p. 12). 
The latter describes 'some trait possessed by the entity and which is assumed to be 
more or less permanent, or at least to be such that some significant change in the 
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b. Few children like spinach 
few c hildren can only be understood along the lines of 'few of the 
children' but not as 'children who are few in number'. Unlike NPs 
introduced by the determiners few, s o m e, etc . , NPs introduced by 
the determiners most, al l, every, e a c h, neither  only have strong, 
partitive-like readings. 
The reason I am using partitivity to describe the strong 
readings, rather than the terms proportional or non-cardinal (cf. 
Partee ( 1988) e.g. ) ,  is because of determiners like five. This 
determiner is never proportional and always cardinal, but it 
nonetheless participates in the same ambiguity as few, cf. (3) .  
(3 )  a. Last year, five babies were born 
In (3a) the predicate is SL and the NP reads as 'babies five in 
number' . On the other hand, in 
b. Last year, five babies were newborns 
the predicate is an IL predicate and we only obtain a reading of the 
subject equivalent to 'five of the babies' . An interpretation of the 
subject as 'babies five in number' is not available. 
In order to capture the intuition that the determiners of weak 
NPs receive a special cardinal reading, Milsark proposes that these 
determiners are in fact non-quantificational cardinality predicates. 
He then suggests that weak NPs in there-insertion sentences receive 
their quantificational force from an existential quantifier hidden in 
the expletive there.  Since strong NPs are considered to be truly 
quantification ai, they are ruled out in there-insertion contexts. It is 
left as an open question how weak NPs obtain their quantificational 
force when they do not appear in there-insertion sentences but rather 
in SPEC of IP, as in (2a) for example. Regarding the generalization 
that weak NPs cannot be the subject of IL predicates, Milsark 
suggests that only quantificational ( strong) NPs make good ' topics' ,  
and that being a topic is a prerequisite for allowing for IL 
predication. 
The question of how weak NPs generally receive their 
quantificational force is one of the central issues discussed in Diesing 
character of the entity will result if the description in altered.' (p.13) I will return to 
the distinction between two types of predication later and for the time being merely 
use SL and IL as descriptive labels. 
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( 1990). She adopts Milsark's analysis of the strong/weak contrast and 
assumes that unlike strong NPs weak NPs are non-quantificational 
and receive their quantificational force through existential closure . 
Extending the scope of Milsark's analysis so as to also account for 
those weak NPs which do not occur in there-insertion sentences she 
argues, first, that all weak NPs appear inside the VP at LF and , 
second, that it is the VP which is a domain of existential closure . 
Evidence for the claim that all weak NPs appear inside VP at 
LF is derived from scrambling in German. Diesing argues that NPs 
that have scrambled out of the VP receive a strong interpretation, 
while NPs that remain inside VP receive a weak interpretation. 
Based on the assumption that German wears its LF on its sleeve, she 
take s  the correlation between an NP being weak and its occuring 
inside VP at S-structure in German to be indicative of which position 
weak NPs in English take at LF. As a consequence of this she 
proposes those weak NPs that appear in Spec of IP at S-structure in 
English lower back into the VP at LF. 
The claim that the VP is a domain of existential closure is made 
in connection with the hypothesis that quantified NPs are interpreted 
in 'tripartite structures'. In particular, Diesing proposes that at a 
level after LF, quantified NPs are mapped into a tripartite structure 
consisting of 'operator', 'restrictive clause' and 'nuclear scope', where 
material outside the VP is mapped into the restrictor and material 
inside the VP is mapped into the nuclear scope ( = Mapping 
hypothesis). Moreover, she assumes that the nuclear scope is the 
place where existential closure takes place. Since weak NPs are 
viewed as non·quantificational, following the lines of M ilsark's 
analysis, Diesing argues that weak NPs, unlike strong NPs, are not 
split apart into a tripartite structure but that they are instead left 
intact and interpreted inside the scope of existential closure .  
The Milsark-type of analysis of weak NPs runs into two 
problems. The second one will be laid out in some detail in the next 
sections. The first one can be stated briefly: existential closure 
cannot be the general source of the quantificational force of weak 
NPs. If it were then it would be predicted that each and every weak 
NP be monotone increasing.2 The reason is that if weak NPs obtain 
their quantificational force from existential closure, as illustrated in 
(4)  E x: somelthree/many /few /no (x) & children (x) in the garden (x) 
2 A determiner is monotone increasing (in its first argument) if it holds that if [D 
A] B then (D A'] B when A .c.  A'. It is decreasing if the opposite is true: if [D A] B 
then (D A'] B when A' .c. A.  
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then they should behave like other existentially quantified NPs, which 
means that they should be monotone increasing. However, this is 
clearly false because of weak NPs introduced by decre asing 
determiners like few, no, and at m ost five ( see Schein 1992, Ben­
Shalom 1993, Beghelli 1993 on maximality). Thus, the view that all 
weak determiners are cardinal predicates and that weak NPs are 
bound by existential closure wrongly predicts that few, for instance, 
which is decreasing, is semantically undistinguishable from a few, 
which is increasing. Therefore we have to abandon the idea that 
there is a process of existential closure for weak NPs and go back to 
the view that even the determiners of weak NPs are quantificational, 
just like those of strong NPs. This means that the ambiguity of the 
determiners few and many is an ambiguity between two genuinely 
quantificational readings, one proportional and one symmetric. 3 4 
The second problem is the following: the ambiguity of 
determiners like few and many gives rise to a distinction between 
NPs that actually does not coincide with the strong/weak distinction. 
For if we take into account the effects of focus inside quantifie d NPs, 
we will see that there are weak NPs that are introduced by 
determiners that are not symmetric but proportional. This suggests 
that the ambiguity of determiners like few and many is independent 
of the Definiteness Effect and that it is necessary to look somewhere 
else for a criterion that allows us to tell apart weak from strong NPs. 
In what follows, I assume that it can indeed be argued that weak 
NPs appear inside the scope of the VP at LF while strongs do not. 
Because of the way focus inside quantified NPs affects their 
semantics, however, I will look for an alternative to the Milsark-type 
3 According to Barwise and Cooper (1981), a determiner is symmetric iff [0 A] B 
< - >  [Q B] A. Moreover, (given that it is conservative) a determiner is symmetric iff 
it is intersective, i.e. [Q A] B < . >  [Q A n  B] B. Determiners like few and many are 
ambiguous between a symmetric and a proportional reading. When they are 
symmetric, it only matters how many things are both A and B. For instance, symmetric 
few requires that the number of things that are both A and B is relatively small. but 
it is irrelevant whether actually all things that are A are picked out so lang as they are 
also B and few in number. On the other hand, this is not true of proportional few. 
Unlike symmetric few, it requires that only a contextually determined small proportion 
of things that are A are also B. Here the number of things that are A is also relevant 
not just the number of things that are in the intersection of A and B. 
" One could try to argue that decreasing determiners do not really pose a problem 
for existential closure, if they can be decomposed into NEG and an increasing 
determiner. For instance, n o  would then convert into NEG and some, few into NEG 
and many, at m ost five into NEG and mOTe than Jive. However, an approach like 
this would violate the lexical integrity of determiners. 
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way of analyzing the weak/strong contrast and, in particular, I argue 
in the spirit of Enc ( 199 1 )  that the (covert) partitivity and 'familiarity' 
of the NP is the crucial divide between weak and strong NPs. In 
connection with the analysis, empirical arguments are given which 
show that a traditional view of the logical form of quantified NPs is 
to be preferred over a tripartite approach. It is also argued that a 
syntactic implementation of the Prague view of focus is what is needed 
to account for the data adequately. Finally, a proposal is made 
concerning scopal properties of subjects which previously have been 
attributed to a semantic distinction between SL and IL predicates. 
2. Focus-affected readings of weak NPs: 
Focus is known to affect the truth conditions of a sentence when 
it occurs inside the scope of intentional operators, expressions like 
only, or adverbs of quantification (Dretske 1972, Rooth 1985, Krifka 
199 1 ) . Consider (5a) vs. (5b), due to Rooth: (CAPS represent focus.) 
(5) a. In St. Petersburg, OFFICERS always escorted ballerinas 
b. In St. Petersburg, officers always escorted BALLERINAS 
These sentences do not have the same truth conditions. Whereas (5a) 
asserts that it was always the case that those who escorted b allerinas 
were officers, (5b) makes a different claim, namely that it was always 
the case that the escorts of officers were ballerinas. It seems then 
that the matrix of the adverb of quantification is determine d  by what 
is focused. (5a) and (5b) can then be argued to have logical forms like 
in (6a) and (7a) (cf. Rooth 1985, Krifka 1992) :5 
(6) a. [Always e :  x escorted ballerinas at e] OFFICERS escorted 
ballerinas at e 
b. [Always e: officers escorted x at e] officers escorted 
BALLERINAS at e 
Consider next the sentence in (7) :  
(7) Few INCOMPETENT cooks applied 
According to much of the literature on the Definiteness Effect (e.g. 
S In the schema [Q A] B, A represents the restriction or first argument of the 
generalized quantifier, and B the matrix or second argument. 
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Milsark 1977, Partee 1988, Diesing 1 990), this sentence should have 
just two . readings : one reading where the determiner is cardinality 
predicate and where the sentence means that the incompetent cooks 
applying were few in number ( = weak reading),  and one reading 
where the determiner is proportional and where the sentence means 
that few of the incompetent cooks applied ( = strong reading).6 These 
readings are given in (8a) and (8b),  respectively. (In (8a),  the NP is 
bound by existential closure since Jew is treated as a non­
quantificational cardinality predicate. The point, however, holds 
equally if it is treated as a symmetric determiner.) 
(8) a. [E x: few (x) & INCOMPETENT (x) & cooks (x)] applied (x) 
b. [Few x: INCOMPETENT (x) & cooks (x )] applied (x) 
It seems that when (7 )  is interpreted both as in (8a) or (8b) focus is 
contrastive, contrasting in c o mpeten t with c o mpete nt, and it can 
also be emphatic. But it has no effect on the meaning or truth 
conditions of the sentence. 
Note now that the re exists a third reading of (7) .  And in this 
reading focus actually changes the meaning and the truth conditions 
of the sentence. In a sense to be made precise, focus here is 
semantic, not just contrastive or emphatic. This suggests that we need 
to distinguish between different types of focus, a question we will 
come back to. The third reading of (7)  can be paraphrased as 'few 
cooks that applied were incompetent.' Its LF is given in (8c): 
c. [Few x: cooks (x) & applied (x)] INCOMPETENT (x) 
Here the determiner of the NP does not have a symmetric 
reading nor does the NP receive the strong reading in (8b),  where the 
proportional Jew is restricted by i n c o mpetent  c o oks. However, (8c) 
is similar to (8b) in that the determiner is proportional. A crucial 
difference is that the restriction of the determiner here corresponds 
to cooks that applied rather than to incompetent cooks and the matrix 
corresponds to to the focused predicate I N C OMPETEN T, rather 
than to the VP. I refer to this type of reading as focus-affecte d (f-a 
reading). 
It is possible to  test whether this reading is really available for 
(7) by checking whether the sentence can be judged true in a scenario 
like the one outlined in (9) .  The prediction is that it can. 
6 Barwise and Cooper (1981) actually do not draw this distinction. but see Partee 
(1988) on how this distinction is implicit in their discussion of the data. 
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(9) Despite the efforts of its tourist board, there remain as many as 
20 incompetent cooks in some small town. They all applied for 
the same job at the hotel. Besides them, also 80 competent cooks 
applied for this job. 
In (9)  actually ALL incompetent cooks applied. At the same time, 
they made up only a rather small fraction of the total number of 
applying cooks, namely 1/5.  And what's more, they were not few, for 
they were 20, which is a considerable number. 
H (7) can be true in (9), then it must have as one of its reading 
the reading represented in (8c) . In other words, it must have one 
reading where it means that few cooks that applied were incompetent. 
First, the fact that actually all incompetent cooks applied rules out 
any analysis of the NP as strong in this reading of (7), cf. (8b).  
Moreover, the fact that the iricompetent cooks applying were 
numerous rules out a symmetric analysis of the NP where it is 
introduced by a symmetric fe w, d. (8a). What remains is an analysis 
of the NP introduced by fe w as f-a, as in (Bc) . It is interesing to note 
that in (8c)  the determiner is proportional and not symmetric. We 
will return to this. 
The characteristic of a f-a reading of an NP is that focus here 
is semantic and not just contrastive or emphatic. It is semantic in that 
it causes the focused predicate to function in the same way the VP 
normally functions, namely as the main predicate of the sentence and 
the matrix of the determiner. This is stated in ( 10) 
( 10) Focus-affected Readings: 
Semantic focus inside an NP gives rise to a f-a interpretation of 
that NP, where the focused predicate serves as the main 
predicate of the sentence and the matrix of the determiner. 
Next, we observe that f-a readings are restricted to certain 
contexts. As the data to be discussed show, f-a readings appear only 
in weak NPs, that is, in those NPs introduced by the determiners fe w, 
many, etc. which occur inside VP at LF. F-a readings are clearly 
impossible in strong NPs, where focus can only be contrastive or 
emphatic but not semantic in the present sense. This distributional 
restriction of f-a readings is stated in ( 1 1 ) :  
( 1 1) Definiteness Effect of f-a readings: 
Contrastive and emphatic focus can appear both in weak and 
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strong NPs. Semantic focus is found only inside NPs that are 
weak.7 8  
The discussion of (7) has shown that when an NP is interpreted 
in f-a terms the determiner need not be symmetric. The 
generalization in (11) then predicts that in the core cases of weak 
NPs, namely there-insertion NPs, a determiner like few or m a ny 
need not be symmetric but can be proportional instead if the NP 
contains a focused predicate and receives a faa interpretation. To see 
whether this is true compare ( 12a) with ( 12b) :  
( 12)  a .  There are many native speakers of Basque THAT ARE 
CITIZENS OF SPAIN 
b. There are many citizens of Spain THAT ARE NATIVE 
SPEAKERS OF BASQUE 
It seems clear that these sentences do not necessarily have the same 
truth conditions, for it is possible to judge the first one true and the 
second one false. But if so, the determiner many here is clearly not 
symmetric. Rather, it appears that ( 12a) and ( 12b) have the faa 
readings given in ( 12c) and ( 12d),  respectively, and that is the reason 
why their truth-conditions diverge. 
c. [Many x: native speakers of Basque (x) & are (x)] CITIZENS 
OF SPAIN (x) 
d .  [Many x: citizens of Spain (x) & are (x)] NATIVE 
SPEAKERS OF BASQUE (x) 
( 12a) means 'many native speakers of Basque (that exist) are citizens 
of Spain', which is true. ( 12b), on the other hand, reads as 'many 
7 This generalization recalls Gueron's (1980) discussion of the contrast between 
definite and indefinite NPs. Sbe argues that at LF indefinite (presentational) subjects 
appear inside the scope of the verb at LF while definite subjects do not. (In the former 
case the verb raises, but not in the latter.) Moreover, she claims that focus on 
indefinite NPs can be contrastive or presentational, while focus on definite NPs can 
only be contrastive. Although the semantics of presentational focus are not very 
explicit, it seems that it could be regarded as a case of semantic focus . .  
8 If weak NPs and strong NPs are inside and outside the VP at LF respectively, as  
i s  assumed bere, then (11) can be stated more generally and we can say that focus i s  
semantic only when i t  occurs inside the VP at  LF. Although it does not deal with focus 
inside quantified NPs, it is interesting to note that Partee (1991) reaches an empirically 
very similar conclusion. For a discussion of the type of analysis employed in Partee 
(1991), see section S. 
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citizens of Spain (that exist) are native speakers of Basque'.  And 
that's false.9 
Note also that parallel to other weak NPs (Milsark 1977, 
Diesing 1990), f-a weak NPs are interpreted inside the scope of the 
VP at LF. A relevant example is given in ( 13) :  
( 13)  Every teacher flunked many RICH kids 
This sentence has many readings, but I want to concentrate on its f-a 
interpretation. Consonant with the generalization in ( 1 1) ,  such a 
reading is only possible when many has VP scope . Thus, the sentence 
can mean that 'for every teacher it is true that many kids that he or 
she flunked were rich.' However, it does not seem to have a reading 
where it is interpreted as ' many kids that are such that every teacher 
flunked them were rich. ' 
The examples in ( 12 )  and ( 13)  show that f-a readings can arise 
in weak NPs.  Let us see now whether they can arise ONLY in weak 
NPs, as is claimed in ( 1 1 ) .  Compare the following two sentences :  
( 14) a. Few/many/no/three/some INCOMPETENT cooks applied 
b. Most/all/every/each INCOMPETENT cook(s) applied 
Consonant with the generalization in ( 1 1) ,  the NPs in the first 
sentence, which are weak, can be interpreted in f-a manner, while the 
NPs in the second sentence , which are strong, cannot. Thus, ( 14a) can 
be read for instance as 'few cooks that applied were incompetent'. 
But ( 14b) cannot mean 'most cooks that applied were incompetent'. 
The sole contribution of focus to the meaning of the sentence here is 
that of contrast or emphasis on incompetent. 
Consider also the example in ( 15) :  
( 15 )  Few/many/no/three/some COOKS like spinach 
In ( 15 ), the NP in question is the subject of an IL predicate, which, as 
we have seen in section 1 . ,  is necessarily strong in that the NP 
9 One could perhaps argue that in (12) the focused predicate, i.e. the relative 
clause, is not inside the NP at S-structure but a sister of it and then suggest that it is 
because of this syntax that the focused predicate is interpreted as the main predicate. 
Notice, however, that f-a reading arise equally in (i) and (ii), where it is impossible to 
argue that the focused predicate is not inside the NP at S-structure: 
(i) There are many SPANISH Basque speakers 
(ii) There are many BASQUE-SPEAKING Spaniards 
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receives a partitive reading. And again, in accordance with the 
generalization in ( 1 1) ,  focus here can only be contrastive or emphatic, 
but it cannot be semantic and no f-a reading is available. In 
particular, ( 14) cannot mean 'few that like spinach are cooks' . Rather 
it means something like 'few cooks and not waiters like spinach.' 
Further evidence that shows that f-a readings do not arise in 
strong NPs but only in weak NPs comes from scrambling in German. 
(16)  a .  weil viele SCHWALBEN wohl in den Sliden fliegen 
b. weil wohl viele SCHW ALBEN in den Sliden fliegen 
'because many SWALLOWS probably fly to the South' 
Scrambled NPs in German are known to receive strong readings, 
whereas non-scrambled are argued to pattern with weak NPs. Given 
( 1 1) ,  we now expect that focus in a scrambled NP can only be 
contrastive or emphatic, whereas the focus in the non·scrambled NP 
can be semantic. This prediction is borne out. While (16a), where 
the NP is scrambled, only allows for the strong reading in ( 16c), 
c. [Many x: SWALLOWS (x)]  fly to the South (x) 
d. [Many x: fly to the South (x)] SWALLOWS (X)10 11  
10 a. also Moltmann (1990). who notes that focns on scrambled NPs is contrastive 
while focus on non-scrambled NPs is presentational in Gueron's sense. (1 should note 
that Moltmann does not share the intuition that scrambled NPs receive strong or 
'specific' readings. In this respect my intuitions do not coincide with hers, but rather 
with those reported in Kratzer 1989 and Diesing 1990.) 
11 llIt is interesting to note non-scrambled NPs can sometimes receive strong 
readings, ego when they are focused. Consider (i), adapted from Kratzer (1989): 
(i) weil ja viele WILDSCHWEINE intelligent sind 
because prtcl. many BOARS intelligent are 
because many BOARS are intelligent 
It seems to me that focus in (i) can only be contrastive. If we assume the 
generalization in (11) then the NP in (i) must be outside the VP at LF, which means 
that it scrambles or QRs at LF. This is consonant with the fact that the NP receives 
a strong reading and that it is the subject of an IL predicate. Note that if true this 
suggests that Diesing's claim that German wears its LF on its sleeve is not accurate. 
Rather, it appears that although German S-structure is 'disambiguating' wrt. to 
scrambled NPs, which must be strong, it is not disambiguating wrt. to non-scrambled 
NPs, which can be either weak or strong. The point that is relevant for (16) is clearly 
that non-scrambled NPs CAN be weak, not that they MUST. Note that if German S­
structure is less revealing than assumed this does not invalidate the claim that weak 
NPs are inside the scope of VP at LF. 
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( 16b), where the NP surfaces in the VP, also allows for the f-a reading 
in ( 16d), meaning 'many things flying to the South are swallows. '  
What these data illustrate is that NPs with f-a readings have the 
same distribution as symmetric weak NPs. In fact, they represent a 
certain kind of weak NP. They clearly differ from other weak NPs in 
that they receive a reading where the determiners few and many are 
proportional. The data thus show that even in those cases where the 
distinction between symmetric and proportional determiner is 
applicable, it does not coincide with the distinction between weak and 
strong NPs. Rather, in distribution at least, the strong/weak contrasts 
seems to correlate with whether an NP appears inside VP at LF or 
not. How this fits in with the claim that the weak/ strong distinction 
has to do with partitivity will be discussed in section 6. First, 
however, I would like to turn to the analysis of f-a readings. 12 
3. An LF analysis of f-a readings: 
The analysis assumes a Davidsonian semantics, specifically the 
theory of events discussed in Higginbotham ( 1987). According to this 
view, all predicates, both so-called SL and IL predicates, have an 
event argument. This is also true of nouns, even non-eventive ones 
like dog (and presumably other predicates) .  Crucially, I take the 
Davidsonsian event operator to mark the scope of the VP and for 
concreteness I assume that it appears in INFL. It follows from the 
generalization that weak but not strong NPs occur inside VP at LF 
that the event variable of weak NPs but not that of strong NPs is 
bound by the event operator. (The latter is bound by the discourse.)  
The strictly Davidsonian semantics adopted here is not 
compatible with Diesing's or similar views of the SL/IL contrast, 
where event argument places are only accorded to SL predicates but 
not to IL predicates (nor to nouns)  (cf. also Kratzer 1989). We then 
have to look for an alternative to explain the facts. In descriptive 
terms, what needs to be accounted for is really the observation that 
12 The data presented involve subjects, but the generalizations in (10) and (11) also 
seem to apply to objects, consider, ego 
(i) I know few FAMOUS skiers 
(ii) I know most FAMOUS skiers 
As predicted by (10) and (11), (i) can have a f-a reading and (ii) cannot: (i) can mean 
'for me it holds true that few of the skiers that I know are famous" but (ii) canDot 
mean 'for me it holds true that most of the skiers that I know are famous.' Notice that 
it is irrelevant here that the predicate is IL, for whether a predicate is SL or IL only 
seems to affect the interpretation of subjects, as shown in Diesing (1990). 
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IL subjects are always strong, while SL subjects can be strong or weak, 
where strong and weak correlate with being outside or inside the 
scope of the VP at LF, or, in our terms, the scope of the event 
operator. I want to suggest that this does not follow from a semantic 
difference between predicates where IL predicates have a different 
argument structure than SL predicates. Rather, the scopal difference 
between IL and SL subjects derives from a notion of grounding. This 
proposal owes much to Milsark's ( 1 977) idea that strong but not weak 
NPs make good 'topics' for sentences where the predicate is IL. 
Let us first adopt the functionalist view that a sentence has to 
be 'about a topic' and, more generally, that the information we aquire 
about the world is organized in terms of what the information is 
about. We will then say that a sentence is 'grounded' in an object or 
an event that meets the description provided by the sentence's topic 
and, moreover, that the topic takes widest scope in the sentence. 
There are of course discourse conditions on topics, but we expect that 
there are also epistemological conditions on the kinds of objects or 
events that provide the grounding for sentences. The sorts of objects 
that we think sentences are 'about' will depend on how we are related 
to these objects. Let us say that 
( 17) Grounding: 
In order for a sentence to be grounded in an event or an NP a, 
where a is the topic of the sentence, it has to as to be in principle 
possible to have epistemological access to a.l3 
Grounding accounts for the scopal differences of IL vs. SL subjects as 
follows : so-called IL predicates typically describe events that are as 
such not epistemically salient to us. Note in this context that verbs of 
perception do not allow for IL small clauses, see ego Raposo and 
Uriagereka (1990) .  Therefore, IL events are not available for 
grounding, and we have to ground an IL assertion in something else, 
namely the subject. In contrast, what are considered SL events are 
epistemologically salient enough to allow for a sentence to be 
grounded in them, which ties in with the observation that verbs of 
perception 'select' SL small clauses. Because of the epistemological 
salience of SL events, SL assertions can be grounded in the event 
itself. Nothing, however, precludes that they are grounded in the 
subject, that is an available option. Thus, the difference between IL 
13 Grounding is a notion. that is similar to but weaker than RusseIrs k n o wledge by 
acquaintan ce. It is weaker because it only says that it must be IN PRINCIPLE 
POSSIBLE to have epistemological access to the thing we are talking about. 
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( 19) £Ir E e :  apply (e)  [vr [NP few x :  cooks(x,e)] O(x,e)  
INCOMPETENT (x)] 
It reads 'there was an event of applying such that few cooks in it were 
agents in it and were incompetent.' This is equivalent to saying 'few 
cooks that applied were incompetent', which is the logical form given 
in ( 8c). The 'in it' part results from the existential event operator 
binding into cooks. The relation 0 is the thematic relation that 
holds between an event and its participants, in this case it is the 
thematic role of being an agent.1S 
In the context of ( 19), it is important to note that we must 
ensure that no subevents are picked when we interpret this type of LF. 
(This was pointed out to me by Hans Kamp, p.c. ) .  The problem is 
that when interpreting ( 19) we can always pick a subevent that is 
small enough that only few of the many cooks are involved in the 
subevent and ( 19)  would be vacuously true. 
One way we might be able to ensure that a sufficiently large 
event is picked out in ( 19) is to substitute the existential operator in 
( 19 )  with a definite description. This would actually also allow us to 
maintain that the decreasing d eterminers of weak NPs are non­
quantificational cardinality predicates and that the quantificational 
force of these NPs derives from existential closure, for by virtue of 
forcing the event be maximal, we would correctly prevent these NPs 
from being increasing (Bill Ladusaw, p.c. ) .  
A reason, however, not  to follow through with this approach is 
that in the same way we prevent weak NPs introduced by decreasing 
determiners from being increasing, we also prevent weak NPs that are 
introduced by increasing determiners from being increasing, so that 
we would again be in a position were i t  is not possible to distinguish 
between the decreasing few and the increasing a few, only that now 
we would say that neither is increasing. 
A second reason not use a d efinite description so as to preclude 
the picking of subevents is that the problem is fully general. It also 
arises in cases where the conditions for definite reference are lacking, 
see Schein ( 1992). Thus, (20) is vacuously true if the adverb quantifies 
over events or times. 
IS If all predicates have event places, then the LF for (18) is actually a bit more 
elaborate, as in (i) : 
(i) [E e: applied (e) ([ few x: cooks (x,e)] ) (x,e) E e': R(e,e') & INCOMPETENT 
(x,e')] 
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and SL assertions reduces to whether it is an event description or the 
subject which is put forth as the topic of the sentence . 
The analysis as such consists in the following claim: a focused 
predicate inside a VP·internal NP extraposes at LF. Thereby it moves 
to a position where it mutually c-commands the VP internal subject 
position and it becomes the main predicate.14 This is shown in ( 1S),  
the LF for the f-a reading of (7):  
(7) 
(8 )  
( lS) 
Few INCOMPETENT cooks applied 




E e: apply(e) VP"",INCOMPETENT (x) 
SPEC V' I 
few x: cooks(x) V 
The question that immediately arises is how does this analysis 
derive the effect that the verb appears in the restriction of the 
determiner in (Sc) . In other words, how do we obtain a logical form 
'few cooks that applied' rather than 'few cooks' without doing violence 
to the syntax and actually moving the verb into the N' at LF or 
removing the determiner from the NP? 
The answer comes rather directly from the Davidsonian 
semantics adopted here. According to this view, the event operator 
binds the event variable of the verb in the LF of (7), asserting the 
existence of an event of applying. It also binds the event variable of 
the NP introduced by few, which means that the NP refers to things 
that are N in the event. But if so, we have actually arrived at the 
equivalent of appli ed literally j oining the restriction. Consider ( 19) :  
1 4  I am adopting the view here that nodes created by adjunction do not create 
barriers for government, following May (1985). It is also assumed that Left Branch 
Extractions are licit at LF. 
(20) Once, noone knows when, noone arrived 
9 1  
Since (20) i s  sensibly used, we must allow the context to restrict the 
event in such a way that we pick a sufficiently large one . One cannot 
simply take the adverb to be a definite description, because , as the 
parenthetical makes clear, the condition for definite reference are not 
met in (20) . But if we rely on the context to pick a sufficiently large 
event in (20), there is no reason to suppose that a similar contextual 
restriction does not also operate in ( 19).  Therefore, let us elaborate 
( 19) as in (21) , where C denotes a relevant context: 
(2 1 )  [E  e : C (e )  & apply (e ) ]  [few x: cooks (x,e) ] E e' : R (e, e ' )  & 
INCOMPETENT (x,e')  
4. A corollary: a syntactic defintion of restriction and matrix 
One consequence of the account of f-a readings of NPs 
presented is that it suggests that it is not the catergorial labels N' and 
VP which determine restriction and matrix of a determiner. Rather, 
it is the syntactic configuration of the sentence. Restriction and 
matrix are now defined as in (22) :  
(22) Matrix and restriction of a generalized quantifier: 
The matrix is the structural main predicate of the sentence, the 
restriction is what is c-commanded by the determiner. 
Most of the time, (22) will give us N' as the restriction, and the VP as 
the matrix, but not always. It crucially will not when focus changes 
the syntax of the sentence. 
With this in mind, let us turn to some data discussed in 
Westerstahl ( 1985) .  He notes that in (23a) the determiner can have 
a reading where its restriction does not consist of the N', and where 
its matrix does not correspond to the VP: he says, 
(23) a. Many SCANDINAVIANS have won the Nobel prize in 
literature 
b. Most SCANDINA VlANS have won the Nobel prize in 
literature 
can mean 'many that are winners of the NP in literature are 
Scandinavians.' He also observes that when we replace m a ny with 
m ost, as in (23)b, such a 'switched' reading is not possible. 
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(24) cannot be interpreted as 'most of those that have won the Nobel 
prize in literature are Scandinavians.' 
Because Westerstahl assumes that the restriction necessarily 
corresponds to the N' and the matrix to the VP, he concludes that 
many in ( 23a) is actually non-conservative : 
(24) Conservativity: (Keenan and Stavi 1986) 
[Q A]B iff [Q A]B n A 
Given that conservativity is supposed to hold of all natural language 
determiners, the conclusion reached in Westerstahl is unexpected .  
Going back to (23a) now, notice that the 'switche d' reading 
actually only arises when S candin avians is focused,  as shown in (25) 
(25 ) Many SCANDINAVIANS have won the Nobel prize in 
literature 
The switched reading is an instance of f-a quantification and (23a) has 
the LF in (26),  where the focused predicate assumes the syntax of the 
main predicate and it becomes the matrix of the d eterminer: 
(26) [E e:  C (e) & win the NP (e )] [many x: things (x,e)  0 (x,e)]  E e' :  
R ( e,e')  & SCANDINAVIANS (x, e')  
Since f-a quantification only arises in weak NPs it  is predicted 
that (23b), where the NP is necessarily strong, does not allow for a 
switched reading. Moreover, since restriction and matrix have been 
defined in purely syntactic rather than categorial terms, we maintain 
that m a ny in (23a), and more generally the determiners of f-a NPs 
are conservative. 
5. Alternative semantics for f-a readings? 
Clearly, the claim that in a f-a readings the focused predicate 
serves as the syntactic main pre dicate of the sentence is strongly 
reminiscent of the traditional intuition that focus represents the main 
assertion of the sentence, d. Prague school linguists, Lobner ( 1990). 
This view of focus differs from that advocated in Rooth ( 1985 ).  
Under Rooth's conception, focus does not affect the predicational 
hierarchy of the sentence. Rather, it is viewed as creating a second, 
alternative semantic value, which, for simplicity's sake, I will refer to 
as the focus frame. The fact that focus can affect the truth conditions 
if embedded under certain operators is attributed not to focus as 
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such, but to the meanings of these operators, which whose meaning is 
expressed in terms of focus and focus frame, cf. (6 ) .  
A question immediately arises as to  whether this second view 
could not also account for f-a readings and why the one argued for 
here should be preferable? I think this view of focus could actually 
account for f-a interpretations, for one could simply add weak 
determiners to the list of focus-sensitive operators. But if focus does 
not affect the syntax of the sentence, then it is not obvious how to 
maintain that determiners are conservative. 
In an effort to secure the conservativity of determiners and at 
the same time keep an alternative view of focus, one could adopt a 
syntactically-minded version of Rooth's theory, ego the view put forth 
in Partee ( 199 1 ), where it is proposed that the focused predicate is 
mapped into the nuclear scope of a tripartite structure and the focus 
frame is mapped into the restrictive clause. If we extend this 
approach to also take into account cases of f-a quantification, we 
obtain the structure in (27) for the f-a reading of (7) :  
(27) 
� I� 
Few [RC x cooks applied] [NS INCOMPETENT] 
At first glance, (27) looks similar to the LF given earlier, 
essentially [E e: apply (e)] [few:x cook (x,e)] INCOMPETENT (x) .  
There is an important difference, however. The tripartite structure 
cannot express that f-a readings are licensed only inside the scope of 
the event operator. But failure to express this causes this view to 
derive a wrong logical form for (28) (Anna Szabolcsi (p.c. ) :  
(28) Few INCOMPETENT cooks ever applied 
(28) does not have a f-a reading for it cannot mean 'few cooks that 
ever applied were incompetent. ' But the tripartite approach would 
predict that exactly this reading is available. This is shown in (29) :  
(29) �� 
Fe�ver (e)  COIOkS (x) applied] [NS INCOMPETENT (x) 1 
In (29) the negative polarity item e ver associated to the event is 
licensed in the scope of few and nothing barrs this structure . It 
remains unexplained why no f-a reading is available for (28 ). 
Under the present analysis, on the other hand, f-a readings 
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arise only inside the scope of the event operator. As a result, if we try 
to give the sentence a f-a interpretation, the e v e r  associated with 
event is not inside the scope of f e w  and fails to be licenced: 
(33) *Ever e:  apply (e)  [few x: cooks (x,e)] INCOMPETENT (x) 
In sum, it seems that the most straight-forward way to account 
for f-a readings and to maintain that determiners are conservative is 
to take the view that focused predicates are syntactically the main 
predicates of their sentence and to NOT assume that quantified NPs 
are split apart into tripartite structures. 
6. The weak/ strong contrast in terms of familiarity: 
The question that remains now concerns the weak-strong 
distinction. We have seen that because of the existence of f-a 
readings it cannot be maintained that the strong/weak contrast 
coicides with whether determiners like f e w  and m a ny are interpreted 
as symmetric or not. After all, when they introduce weak NPs with f-a 
readings, fe w  and many are proportional. As an alternative way of 
telling apart weak and from strong NPs, let us consider Enc's ( 199 1 )  
proposal that the relevant notion i s  partitivity. 
Enc argues that strong NPs are 'familiar' in that they can be 
anaphorically related to an antecedent in the discourse, while weak 
NPs are 'novel'. Assuming that a definite description inside an NP is 
what allows for an anaphoric relation, she argues that strong but not 
weak NPs are ( covert) partitives. (34) shows that familiarity is really 
the crucial divide between strong and the two types of weak NPs . 
(34) The hotel fired all its employees. Few INCOMPETENT cooks 
reapplied .  
To make sense out of the discourse one virtually has to  relate the 
incompetent cooks talked about in the second sentence to the 
employees mentioned in the first, i.e. only a 'familiar' interpretation 
of the NP f e w  IN C OMPTENT c o o ks is sensible here. Notice now 
that the only reading of the NP we obtain in (34) is a strong one, 
meaning 'few of the incompetent cooks' . Both a reading of the NP 
where the determiner is symmetric and f-a reading ('few cooks that 
reapplied were incompetent' ) are clearly not available. This shows 
that familiarity succesfully tells apart strong NPs not only from 
'regular' weak NPs, but also from f-a weak NPs. 
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Let us then say that the determiners of strong NPs se lect a 
definite description as their complement, while the determiners 
introduCing weak NPs do not . Formulating it in terms of the DP­
hypothesis, the determiners introducing strong NPs select for a DP in 
their complement, while the determiners introducing weak NPs select 
for an NP (cf. ego Stowell 1989) .  If we now assume that the presence 
of a definite description creates a domain that is opaque to 
extraction, then we have an account of why strong NPs do not allow 
f-a readings : they do not allow for a focused predicate to be 
extracted. Notice that it is also exactly the group of strong NPs which 
does not allow for overt extraction and which exhibit the Specificity 
Condition (cf. Fiengo and Higginbotham 1980). We can then argue 
that the impossibilty of f-a readings of strong NP is really the result 
of the Specificity Condition applying. to extraction at LF. 
7. Conclusion: 
Looking at the effects of focus inside quantified NPs, we have 
seen that even with NPs introduced by few and m a ny, the 
Definiteness Effect cannot be attributed to an ambiguity of the 
determiners, and is instead better accounted for in terms of ( covert) 
partitivity. We have also seen arguments that show that all NPs, even 
weak ones, are quantificational in the traditional sense. The truth­
conditional effects of focus inside NPs have been accounte d  for by 
giving a concrete syntactic expression to the functionalist view that 
focus represents the main assertion of the sentence . A concrete 
proposal concerning another functionalist notion, namely that of 
topic, has also made it possible to explain scopal properties of 
subjects without attributing them to a lexical difference between SL 
and IL predicates. 
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